The closeness to the original is deliberate and visible. There is no attempt here to do a naked translation, nor a homage. The point is to show that so much of what feels gestural, or even strained, in English clarifies when allowed to operate in a langauge that does not demand quite so much psychological justification or lyrical payoff. That this language lies on the other side of the world is incidental. What matters is that it is there, ready to give voice to a poem that E

China’s tech elite quotes Mao and Silicon Valley alike while excluding the writers who refused power’s flattery. What emerges is not cultural hybridity but a perfected machinery of control. The writers who most truthfully describe modern China—Can Xue, Yan Lianke, Yu Hua—rarely appear on the bookshelves of its technology elites. They are too strange, too literary, too unwilling to flatter success. Instead, the founders and venture capitalists of Shenzhen and Hangzhou reach f

At that point, "outcomes" will be decided not by the most sophisticated optimizer but by whoever holds the most primitive monopoly. That may be the final irony of power after belief: having discarded every inherited constraint in pursuit of maximum optionality, it ends by returning to the oldest constraint of all. The age of recombination gives way to the age of consolidation, and the consolidation will be decided not by those who were cleverest at dismantling frameworks but

Beijing doesn't need Europe to choose China. It needs Europe not to choose at all. But when alignment becomes engineering rather than politics, the debate ends with a purchase order. In 2024, Germany's interior ministry announced agreements with telecommunications operators to remove Huawei and ZTE components from 5G networks. Core networks would be cleared by the end of 2026; access and transport networks by the end of 2029.

In essence, what the WEF cannot readily admit is that governance of the kind it claims to facilitate has always depended on asymmetry and cost absorption, and that neither is currently available in sufficient degree.

From cleaner skies in Beijing to lingering coal dependence on the Indo-Gangetic Plain, decarbonization is proceeding by accumulation rather than replacement. The result is a transition governed less by technology than by the management of loss.

When Donald Trump suggested the United States might acquire Greenland, analysts scrambled to answer an interpretive emergency, enthusiastically explaining before determining whether anything had, in fact, occurred. Interests were assumed to exist, and then they were searched for. Yet when none materialized, the action itself was declared incoherent.

After decades of incremental progress, nuclear fusion sits at an inflection point. The remaining uncertainties strain the justificatory frameworks of modern systems. China’s response reveals the constraints shaping contemporary state imagination.

This is the most successful demographic fiction in human history, and the most disturbing achievement of state power: not to compel belief but to make compulsion unnecessary. To build identities so convincing they erase the memory of their own construction.

China has built the world's largest renewable-energy system—an empire of turbines, panels, and ultra-high-voltage lines. Yet much of this power goes nowhere. The problem is not technical but political: a system that mobilizes faster than it can coordinate.

The Spring Festival migration is often called the largest annual human movement on earth—three billion trips compressed into forty days. But the language of "return" obscures what actually happens. People are not going home. They are visiting the site where home used to be.

Opacity is not concealment but signal. It announces that nothing remains to be discovered. The Party distrusts interiority, preferring what can be audited. Repetition becomes verification. Each slogan, each anecdote, each Du Fu quotation functions as a maintenance log of belief: predictability as the last form of sincerity left standing.

Beneath the institutional surface lies something older: a civilizational substrate that organized Japanese political identity long before the modern state existed and still shapes what can be naturally said.

Thailand’s political genius lies less in progress than in poise: a system that converts ambiguity into rule and uncertainty into stability. Where its neighbours convulse, Bangkok endures. Political time circulates rather than advances. Each apparent rupture — coup, election, protest, dissolution — replenishes the system’s balance. The state sustains itself through crisis, adjusting its temperature without changing form. Deferral is not weakness but rhythm: the pulse of a poli

When Vladimir Putin reversed course on Russia’s deeply unpopular pension reform in 2018—first delaying, then softening the plan—commentators called it vintage Putinism. When, a year later, he forced it through unchanged, they called that vintage Putinism too. Whatever he does, it seems, is Putinism.

Western pharmaceutical companies outsourced their way to efficiency—and into dependency. Now Washington wants sovereignty without paying for it. But biologics manufacturing isn't a contract you can cancel; it's expertise accumulated over decades.

By monopolizing rare earth refining, China translated geology into administrative time. The result is leverage that teaches its own obsolescence—and a preview of sovereignty's failure on a planetary scale. At Baotou, where Inner Mongolia's grasslands dissolve into industrial haze, the tailings ponds shimmer an unnatural green-black. A technician in a mask checks a manifest, then a screen. Approval occurs silently—one more shipment cleared for the machinery of tomorrow. The s

Taiwan is not just a flashpoint between Washington and Beijing but the fulcrum of the post-1945 order. Its fate will decide whether power in the Indo-Pacific can still be balanced without conquest—and whether the rules that restrained great powers for eight decades can survive.

Xi Jinping’s purges of the People’s Liberation Army are acts of cultivation — pruning for control, not eliminating rivals. But the system he built may now operate beyond his design. Across a decade of purges culminating in the 2025 reshuffle, Xi Jinping has treated the People's Liberation Army less as an institution than a system under calibration. His campaigns of "rectification" are not spasms of insecurity but acts of cultivation — pruning for control rather than eliminati

The scandal’s true revelation is not that Beijing infiltrated Westminster but that Britain’s own institutions have been infiltrated by disbelief. A political class that once prided itself on pragmatism now confuses pragmatism with evasion. The empire of colonies gave way to the empire of rhetoric, and the latter has fallen to an empire of doubt. The machinery of state still hums—but no one can quite remember what tune it is meant to play.