Danantara and the Unaudited Sovereign


Danantara has gathered Indonesia’s state enterprises under presidential control, but has yet to publish the consolidated accounts that would let Indonesians judge how their wealth is being managed.
Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa served for a year as Indonesia's finance minister before being dismissed on 14 September and replaced by his own deputy, Suahasil Nazara, who had also served under Sri Mulyani Indrawati. The government gave no specific reason. Reuters subsequently reported a clash over personnel changes involving customs chief Djaka Budhi Utama, while Purbaya’s disputes over liquidity and state finances had supplied other sources of friction.
One of those disputes concerned a claim on Danantara's profits. At the finance ministry in Jakarta on 28 August, Purbaya announced that Rp120 trillion, about $6.8 billion, would pass into the national budget, entering the accounts as Pendapatan Negara Bukan Pajak Lainnya, other non-tax state revenue, rather than under the dividend classification used before Danantara existed. Sekitar Rp120 triliun untuk tahun ini, he said. Itu yang diputuskan oleh Presiden. Around Rp120 trillion was needed this year was the president's decision. Pressed on the mechanism, he conceded that he did not yet know whether the payment would formally be treated as dividends. By 3 September, he was acknowledging that Danantara had refused. Meanwhile, Rosan Roeslani, who runs Danantara and also serves as investment minister, having previously headed the Prabowo–Gibran national campaign team, was reportedly surprised by the announcement. Eleven days later, Purbaya was gone.
Whatever part the quarrel played in his dismissal, Purbaya left behind a claim whose status remained unclear. Establishing what the treasury could expect meant first asking how money was supposed to move through Danantara.
The legal framework is less exacting than summaries tend to suggest. Peraturan Pemerintah 34/2025 requires Danantara to record asset transactions under accounting standards determined by its own head, and its executive to report periodically to its supervisory board. The amended state-enterprise law, Undang-Undang 16/2025, places a finance ministry representative on that board and assigns examination of Danantara’s financial management to Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK), the Supreme Audit Agency. Neither instrument establishes a deadline for publication. BPK has flagged a related defect further inside the reporting chain, observing that the absence of a stipulated deadline for submitting Danantara's report to the government creates uncertainty.
The regulation is clearer about the money. Dividends entering the structure become part of Danantara's assets. Profits from managing those assets belong to Danantara, and only after provision for investment losses and capital accumulation may any part of them go to the treasury. Annual earnings may then be divided among a mandatory reserve, which builds toward 20 percent of capital, retained earnings, and a payment to the state. Once that year's reserve has been set, the president may determine the state’s share, which Article 37 requires to be fixed by presidential decree. In brief, the accounts help establish what can prudently be taken, but it's the president who determines the payment.
Purbaya attributed the decision to the president rather than claiming it as his own. Whether Rp120 trillion, or any other sum, becomes payable depends upon a presidential decree, and no decree authorizing this payment has been identified in published databases. That is not proof that none exists, since not every presidential administrative decision is published, but the relevant number and date are now the most useful questions anyone can put to Danantara and the Sekretariat Presiden.
Dony Oskaria, Danantara’s COO, has spoken of roughly Rp330 trillion in profits across the companies beneath it, without clearly identifying the period. Reporting drawn from the audited central-government accounts puts BPI Danantara’s 2025 profit at Rp145.3 trillion, against a target of Rp200 trillion for this year. No published consolidated statement shows how these numbers fit together. They describe different levels of a structure whose figures cannot safely be added or compared without knowing how transactions between its constituent entities have been treated.
Set Rp120 trillion against the Rp145.3 trillion reported in the central-government accounts and it amounts to more than four-fifths of a year’s profit, which would be a remarkable distribution if the denominator were the right one. The published figures do not establish whether it is, how much of that profit exists as distributable cash, what has already moved between Danantara’s constituent entities, what reserve has been set, or which investment commitments the payment would displace.
A distribution from a state fund becomes publicly arguable when the earnings and policy behind it are visible. Khazanah Nasional presented its 2025 results on 10 February this year, six weeks after the year ended, reporting realizable asset value of RM156 billion, operating profit of RM5.6 billion and a dividend of RM2 billion to the Malaysian government. Its full consolidated accounts, published on Khazanah’s site, run to some 350 pages of statements and notes and carry an Ernst & Young audit report dated 23 April. Anyone wishing to argue that RM2 billion was too much or too little had material with which to argue.
Temasek publishes considerably less than Khazanah and therefore offers a useful test of Danantara’s position. As an exempt private company under Singapore’s Companies Act, it is not required to publish its statutory consolidated financial statements. Instead, it publishes a condensed group financial summary drawn from them, together with a statement from KPMG, which has issued unmodified audit opinions every year since 2022. The report covering the year to 31 March 2026 is dated 29 June. Exemption from publication is compatible with a named auditor and a regular public account of the fund’s finances.
In fairness, Danantara faces the difficulty of consolidating close to a thousand enterprises for the first time, and BPI Danantara did submit its entity-level 2025 report to the state-enterprise supervisory body on 11 May, under letter S-116/DI-MDF/V/2026, even while the laporan keuangan konsolidasian covering the wider structure remains unfinished.
Yet it's undeniable that the public timetable has been hard to follow. In May, the fund said its reports would go to the audit agency, then amended the statement to remove that reference, leaving an assurance that the report would undergo audit in accordance with the law. On 31 May, Dony Oskaria said consolidation would be finished by the end of June. On 2 July, the fund announced that every enterprise in its ecosystem had completed its own reporting while the consolidated statement masih berada dalam proses penyelesaian, remained in the process of completion.
According to detik’s report of 21 September, Danantara submitted the unaudited consolidated accounts to BPK on 20 July, and an examination assignment letter followed on 14 August. In the meantime, on 5 August, Oskaria had said BPK would examine the report and offered a further estimate of one to two months, pointing to early October. Submission for audit represents progress, but it does not make the accounts available to the public.
Adisatrya Suryo Sulisto, deputy chairman of the parliamentary commission overseeing state enterprises, has publicly urged Danantara to disclose its reports to maintain public trust. On 3 June, a coalition of civil society groups—the Center of Economic and Law Studies, Indonesia Corruption Watch, Enter Nusantara and CERAH—filed information requests with both Danantara and BPK, attempting through public-information law to obtain disclosure that the Danantara legislation had left without a timetable.
While the consolidated accounts remain unpublished, Danantara continues to announce substantial investment plans. Roughly $12 billion was allocated in its first year, while six downstream resource-processing, or hilirisasi, projects had a combined investment value of about $7 billion. Its CIO told an audience in Davos that as much as $14 billion would be deployed this year. The announcements show what Danantara intends to do with its capital, but the unpublished accounts would show how much it can afford. Until they appear, the scale of its ambition is easier to establish than its capacity to finance it.
Suahasil Nazara took office promising a credible budget. Yet the Rp120 trillion his predecessor announced remains a presidential decision in a minister’s account of it with no paper trail. Neither the decree nor the consolidated accounts is public. Put bluntly, Indonesians have been told what their president decided before being shown what their country can afford.



